This work develops a two-country, two-firm model of imperfect competition to show that antitrust policy may be anticompetitive both at home and abroad. Antidumping has a procompetitive effect abroad. At home antidumping is anticompetitive in a static framework but procompetitive in a repeated game. The anticompetitive effect of antidumping is shown to be enhanced by the presence of a domestic antitrust policy. If trade and antitrust policies are co-ordinated, welfare is found to be more sensitive to antitrust than to antidumping. Hence, antidumping and antitrust are imperfect substitutes. 
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Antitrust and some trade considerations
The goal of antitrust regulation and activity is, by definition, to promote competition on the market even if some of the competitors are harmed as a result. The intended effect of a competition policy is to lower prices by increasing competition, to the benefit of the consumer.
The effects of restrictions imposed by antitrust authorities may turn out to be the opposite of the intended ones. In a theoretical model of duopoly, it can be shown that a restriction on market share results in higher prices and implies more collusive behaviour on the part of firms. The idea is similar to the one developed by Krishna (1985) about the effect of quantitative restrictions on international trade.
Assume there are two firms on Market 1 producing differentiated goods and facing demands: x 1 =1p 1 +ap 21 , and x 21 =1p 21 +ap 1 , 0<a<1. The notation with double subscript is used for consistency with the next sections, where a two-country model is developed. The first digit stands for "Firm 2," whereas the second one stands for Suppose Firm 2 has a higher marginal cost than Firm 1, such that the restriction on market share is binding to Firm 1. This situation is shown by Figure 1 . Firm 1's reaction function is the two-segment line QLK 1 . Since the constraint is binding to Firm 1, Firm 2 has the opportunity of setting p 21 in such a way as to maximise its profits, given p 1 = A(S)+p 21 B(S). This is a situation of price leadership, which is always possible since K 1 is steeper than R 1 and flatter than R 2 . 
Antidumping
The literature on antidumping and prices
A body of literature on the influence of antidumping laws on pricing already exists.
Wares (1977) shows that when the domestic market is perfectly competitive, antidumping makes the foreign firm export less and sell more in its own (foreign) market. Webb (1992) Antidumping prevents the foreign firm from doing so, thus changing the pay-off structure of the game. Hartigan (1994) comes back to a purely anticompetitive type of dumping, the predatory one. Nevertheless, the assessment as to whether a foreign firm dumps is still dependent on the price the foreign firm charges on the foreign market.
The author finds that antidumping laws enhance or inhibit the signal the foreign firm sends to the domestic firm about its costs. This signal is sent by the price the foreign firm charges on the domestic market.
The effect of antidumping on the Bertrand duopoly
This section looks at the effect of an antidumping provision on equilibrium prices in a
Bertrand duopoly model in the absence of any other trade or competition policy. It is shown that antidumping reduces the market power of the monopoly in the foreign country but increases prices on the domestic market. Section 4 will combine the results of this section and of Section 2 in order to assess the combined effects of antitrust and antidumping on prices.
The term "dumping" is understood here as "selling abroad at a lower price than in the producer's (i.e., the exporter's) home country." Nevertheless, the model developed in this section considers that the government may allow for a margin of dumping on grounds of efficiency or other reasons. A partial antidumping duty is modelled by D, the antidumping ratio, as will be explained below. In the current practice of antidumping, this definition tends to be replaced by "selling abroad at a price lower than a 'fair' value."
A foreign producer may sell abroad more cheaply than at home for various reasons.
Let us denote by "1" the home market, that is, the market where the government wants to implement antitrust and antidumping policies. Notation "2" stands for the foreign market. First, if the foreign producer has a dominant position in its home market (Market 2) while the importing market (Market 1) is more competitive, the exporter gets profits by discriminating on prices. This is possible only when arbitrage between the two countries cannot take place. Then, if Market 1 is a new one for the exporter, lower prices may be, for instance, promotional or aimed at achieving economies of scale. One last reason for dumping, from the point of view of the firm involved, would be to drive local competitors out of business (predatory dumping). In the model developed below, dumping is the result of a difference in price elasticities of demand between two markets, which permits price discrimination. Firm 2 solves the problem:
equivalent to: All the equilibrium points inside the parabola correspond to higher profits since Firm 2 earns more by selling both at home and abroad than by selling only domestically.
There are several points one can note with respect to the constrained equilibrium.
First, antidumping does not involve Firm 1's reaction function. Consequently, the nature of the strategic interaction between the two firms is not changed although the equilibrium set of prices is.
Then, it can be easily shown that both A(D) and B(D) depend positively on D for a market size, M, which is not higher than 2+c 2 . Therefore, a change in D has two effects on Firm 2's reaction function. First, an increase in D shifts the curve toward higher prices. Second, an increase in D also tilts the curve toward higher prices. The two effects are cumulative, and the overall effect is an increase in the equilibrium prices with respect to the unconstrained equilibrium prices.
In Figure 3 , the curve R 2 D is steeper than R 2 because, for D=d antidumping has a procompetitive effect on the foreign market as long as Firm 2 keeps selling in both markets. Firm 2 becomes a "constrained" monopoly in Market 2, charging less than the monopoly price.
Antidumping and antitrust
In the previous section it was shown that the equilibrium price in Bertrand-Nash equilibrium before an antidumping provision is enforced; that is, neither of them is bound by the market share restriction. The market share constraint obliges the firms to keep prices between lines K 1 and K 2 (see Figure 1 ).
When Firm 2 is obliged to increase price p 21 because of the introduction of an antidumping constraint, Firm 1 may find itself bound by the market share constraint.
Therefore, the foreign firm finds itself in a leading position, being able to further increase price and profit in Market 1, as shown in Section 2. The new (higher) price in Market 1 permits Firm 2 to raise the price in the foreign market as well in order to maintain the same value of the dumping ratio d=D.
The first conclusion of this analysis is that the foreign firm may do better in Market 1 when antidumping is enforced in the presence of an antitrust provision. Another conclusion is that a domestic competition policy is anticompetitive both at home and abroad since it raises prices in both markets. One still has to keep in mind that the existence of the antidumping provision promotes competition abroad by establishing a link between the two markets, undermining the monopoly in Market 2. 
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